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BAR BRIEFS

the bill (S. B. 65) was to fix maximum limits at a more reasonable
point, and that the term "loss", as applied to the table for specific
benefits, was not to be confined to "loss by severance."
It became necessary to construe the amendment in a specific case
recently, and the Bureau, by a divided vote, held that the term "loss"
meant "loss by severance" only. The reasons given for such construction were: That the first part of paragraph E of Section 3 (though
unchanged) related only to partial permanent disability of the body
(although the words "of the body" have never been in the law) ; that
the law, as it was prior to this amendment, gave the Bureau authority
to fix the schedule of benefits, that, when the Bureau fixed such
schedule by a Rule, it made provision for ankylosed (stiff) joints, and
that the Legislature should, therefore, have incorporated the Rule or
added to the word "loss" the words "or loss of use," if it intended the
schedule to cover ankylosis.
The dissenting view, as expressed by Commissioner Wenzel, was:
That the foregoing construction was technical rather than liberal; that
it was questionable in the light of the "reasonable interpretation" enjoined by courts of last resort; that, in effect, it was saying that a
stiff finger or hand was not lost, regardless of how useless it might
be; that, if the theory were followed to its logical conclusion, voluntary
submission to an amputation-if not actually required by and at the
time of treatment of the injury-would not entitle the claimant to
compensation for the permanent disability, because one could not be
said to "lose" that which he voluntarily cut off; that the majority view
expressed by the Legislature, though unrecorded, should govern on
the question of "intent"; and that, if the Bureau felt justified in making
a general rule before, it should apply the same standard of interpretation now.

GRADE CROSSING RULE
One G. was driving an automobile truck along a public highway
at a rate of IO to 12 miles per hour as he approached a railroad crossing with which he was familiar. It was daylight. About 40 feet from
the crossing he cut this rate down to 5 or 6 miles per hour. View of
the track was obscured by a section house on the left of the driver.
This prevented a clear view of the whole track in that direction until a
point about 20 feet from the first rail was reached. A train, coming
from the left at a speed of about 6o miles per hour, hit the truck. G.
being unable to stop the truck after he saw the train. G. was killed.
The failure to stop was held to be contributory negligence, defeating
the right to recover from the railroad company, Justice Holmes using
the following language: "When a man goes upon a railroad track he
knows that he goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes
upon him before he is clear of the track. He knows that he must
stop for the train, not the train stop for him. In such circumstances
it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train
is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle although
obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and
look. It seems to us that if he relies upon not hearing the train or
any signal and takes no further precaution he does so at his own risk.
If, at the last moment, G. found himself in an emergency it was hiF
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own fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier or come to a stop.
It is true . . . that the question of due care very generally is left to
the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of conduct, and when
the standard is clear it should be laid down once for all by the Courts."
-B. & 0. RR. Co. vs. Dora Goodman, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24.
We call attention to this statement particularly, "It seems to us
that if lie relies upon not hearing the train OR ANY SIGNAL and
takes no further precaution he does so at his own risk," and wonder
how far the Court would apply the rule where there are gates or other
mechanical devices, particularly if the same should happen to be out
of order.
PROSECUTING OFFICIALS
The Journal of the American Judicature Society, discussing "What
Is Wrong with the Prosecutor" in the October issue, briefly dismisses
two proposals for dealing with what it claims to be general dissatisfaction with our prosecuting officials, and follows this with its own
proposal.
The proposals dismissed are: The public defender plan, which it
recognizes as serviceable in large cities, but otherwise characterizes as
"a mere patch on a defective system"; and the plan of appointing
prosecutors by the courts, which, it maintains, is borne of a false conception of the office and is also unconstitutional.
The Journal's constructive suggestion is that the local prosecutor
should serve as the appointed deputy of the attorney general, should be
choser from among the older members of the Bar, be provided with
an adequate salary, be permitted to hold office during good behavior,
and be transferred from point to point as the respective abilities of the
men and the importance of the trials may demand. This, it is contended, will coordinate the work of the prosecutor's office, remove
the individual prosecutor from the influence of politics, and enable
him to do his work with greater freedom and without working unreservedly for convictions in order to acquire professional reputation.
Coming, as it does, from a Journal of very high standing professionally, the suggestion is worth more than a passing thought on the
part of the North Dakota Bar.
AN IMPRESSIVE RECORD
Great Britain's experience with unemployment insurance and old
age pensions is one that should cause the American taxpayer to pause
before assuming the burdens of a "dole system." In 1911 Great Britain paid old age pensions to 613,873 persons, the amount paid being
$30,405,892. By 1925 the number of persons receiving aid had increased to 900,536, and the amount paid to $107,822,174. During the
period from 1912 to 1926 the number of recipients of outdoor relief
also rose from 4o8,1o6 to 1,003,399.
EIGHT HOUR LAW
The County Court of Ward County recently held the North Dakota
Eight Hour Law for Women unconstitutional, in cases brought by the
Minimum Wage Department of the 'Workmen's Compensatio. Bureau.

